

NATIONAL COAL BOARD
CHATTERLEY-WHITFIELD COAL BOARD UNIT

Underground fire in the Old Whitfield
Seam, Hesketh Pit, 9th December, 1948:

Sequence of events compiled by Messrs Wilcox, Sub-Area Agent, Hay, Manager, McBride, Safety & Research Engineer, N.C.B. - North Staffs., and Messrs Jenkins and Irwin, H.M. Inspectors of Mines.

On the night shift of the 8th/9th December, 1948, there were 92 men in the Institute Pit and 147 in the Hesketh Pit, making a total of 239 men underground in the Institute and Hesketh Pits.

At 2.45 a.m. on the morning of the 9th December, 1948, Mr. Hay, the Manager, received a telephone message from the Colliery that there was an outbreak of fire underground in the Hesketh Pit.

Mr. Walker, the Undermanager, was also sent for.

At 3.00 a.m., Mr. Wilcox, Sub-Area Agent, was sent for.

All messages went from the Colliery Lamproom.

Mr. Hay and Mr. Walker came to the Colliery immediately, and the Sub-Area Agent arrived at 3.10 a.m.

After a short discussion between the Manager, the Undermanager and the Sub-Area Agent, it was decided that the Manager and the Undermanager should go underground and the Sub-Area Agent should stay on the Surface to give instructions.

At 3.30 a.m., the Sub-Area Agent gave instructions for the withdrawal of workmen from the Hesketh and Institute Pits, except those required by the Manager and Undermanager to deal with the emergency. He further gave instructions that the Institute men were to be directed to travel via the Hesketh Main Crut, and a guard was posted on No. 4 Cross Cut so that the men should not inadvertently enter the smoke.

At 3.50 a.m. the Sub-Area Agent telephoned to Mr. G. Jenkins, H.M. District Inspector of Mines, and, immediately afterwards, Mr. E. Cope, Area Production Manager, was informed.

At 4.00 a.m., Mr. Hay reported to the Sub-Area Agent that the Old Whitfield dip belt and dip roadway were on fire. Attempts were being made to subdue the fire with stonedust, fire extinguishers, and water which was available on site.

The location of the fire was in the vicinity of the dip belt driving motor, and the belting and the dip roadway were on fire as far as could be observed.

In checking out the workmen at the Lamproom, three persons were unaccounted for :-

SAMUEL RICHARD HUGHES, fireman;
HARRY COOKE, collier; - who were known to
be working in the rise heading in the Old Whitfield district; and

PERCY SHEARER, Haulage Pulley Oiler, who was known to
be working between No's. 3 and 4 Junctions in the Bambury Main
Dip, Institute Pit.

The Bambury Main Dip and Back Dip are the main returns from the Bambury districts in the Institute Pit and the Bowling Alley and the Old Whitfield districts in the Hesketh Pit.

At 4.10 a.m., the Sub-Area Agent informed the Mines Rescue Station at Stoke that assistance was required and, at the same time, despatched three cars to collect members of the Whitfield Rescue Brigades. Two Brigades were available, together with their equipment, at approximately 5.00 a.m.

At 4.15 a.m. Mr.G.Jenkins and Mr.W.G.Irwin, H.M.Inspectors of Mines, arrived together with Mr.Cope.

At 5.00 a.m. Messrs Cope and Irwin descended the Hesketh shaft, and proceeded via the Hesketh Back Crut, and through the separation doors along the neutral length to the Bambury Cross Cut. At this point they were met with a current of dense smoke coming from inbye, passing through the Bambury Cross Cut and into the Bambury back dip and main dip.

At 5.30 a.m., a Rescue Brigade was briefed by H.M.District Inspector of Mines and the Sub-Area Agent to descend the Institute Pit, to proceed along the Bambury main crut and travel down the Bambury main dip to No.4 Cross Cut in search of PERCY SHEARER, who was last known to be at work between No's. 3 and 4 Junctions.

Meantime, Messrs Cope and Irwin were informed that this Brigade had been sent on this mission and, between them, they decided that Mr.Cope should wait for the arrival of the Brigade at No.4 Bambury Cross Cut on the intake side, and that Mr.Irwin should proceed inbye to the Old Whitfield district.

The Brigade arrived at No.4 Bambury Cross Cut at approximately 6.30 a.m., after having searched a length of roadway 900 yards long, and reported to Mr.Cope that the smoke was so thick that members of the Brigade had to be lashed together to keep in touch with each other, and visibility was so bad that they had had to travel on their hands and knees. In their passage down the dip they had failed to locate the presence of PERCY SHEARER.

Mr.Cope then decided to send B.Basnett (Overman) and A.Walker (Fireman) down the North Bambury Dip, which is an intake, to No.8 Bambury Dip Junction, with instructions to examine the Bambury Dip and adjacent roadways up to No.4 Bambury Dip Junction or until they met smoke, in search of Shearer. They did not succeed in finding Shearer.

At 5.30 a.m., a Rescue Brigade proceeded into the Old Whitfield main level and up the Old Whitfield face in an attempt to rescue COOKE and HUGHES from the rise heading above the top level of the Old Whitfield face, where they were last known to be at work.

At about 6.00 a.m., the Sub-Area Agent applied for the assistance of two Rescue Brigades from the Victoria Unit, one from the Sneyd Unit and two from Norton Unit, and these were forthcoming with a minimum of delay. There were now eight Brigades available.

At 6.15 a.m., the Brigade which had entered the Old Whitfield level and face returned to the outbye end of the level. The Captain reported that he had taken the Brigade about three-quarters of the way, or approximately 100 yards, up the Old Whitfield face. He reported that the face was very thick with smoke, and had instructed the Brigade to withdraw because he considered no useful purpose could be accomplished in running any further risk.

By this time smoke began to issue from an old heading 50 yards along the Old Whitfield level, and to re-enter the intake and make its way to the dip belt where men without apparatus were fighting the fire. These men had to be withdrawn, and a bag stopping was built at the old heading by the Rescue Brigade to check this emission of smoke so that fire fighting could again proceed.

At 7.45 a.m., Messrs Cope and Irwin travelled up the Old Whitfield face, proceeding to within ten yards of the foot of the rise heading where Cooke and Hughes were last known to be at work.

In the course of their travel, although smoke had apparently abated, the atmosphere was such to cause their eyes to smart and water. On resting at this point they heard a roaring sound.

On proceeding to the inbye end of the top loading level and looking outbye, they observed the roadway burning fiercely and concluded that to fight the fire was hopeless, as there was some 80 to 100 yards of roadway alight.

They did search as far as possible for Messrs Cooke and Hughes, but saw no signs of them, although they crawled under the smoke for some distance.

On retreating along the top level, and when about half-way down the face, they met Mr. Hay with whom they retreated further to the telephone station at the inbye end of the main level at the bottom of the face; the time was 8.30 a.m.

A Rescue Brigade had arrived at this point.

Mr. Cope telephoned to say that he was taking a Rescue Brigade inbye up the face along the top level towards the rise heading, in an endeavour to locate and recover Hughes and Cooke.

Mr. Irwin had a telephone conversation with Mr. Jenkins, H.M. District Inspector of Mines, as to the probabilities of the recovery of Messrs Hughes and Cooke. Mr. Irwin thought that there was a fifty-fifty chance, although the smoke was dense and the heat intense at the bottom of the rise heading.

When Mr. Cope and the Rescue Brigade advanced to the inbye end of the top loading level, they found the roadway burning fiercely.

In an attempt to prevent the fire extending further, the Rescue Brigade severed the conveyor belt and dug a trench in the floor with a view to exploring the rise heading where Cooke and Hughes were last known to be at work.

In spite of persistent attempts to penetrate the rise heading, the Rescue Brigade had to retreat because of the intensity of the heat and the denseness of the smoke.

At about 9.00 a.m. another Brigade arrived, and were met by the Manager, Mr. Hay, at the telephone station, who took them up to the fresh air base in close proximity to the seat of operations in charge of Mr. Cope.

At about 9.40 a.m., Mr. Hay returned to the main level and despatched a batch of fire extinguishers to the Rescue Brigade, who discharged them with little or no effect.

At 10.20 a.m. Mr. Cope came outbye to the telephone to report on the position to the Area General Manager, who had been in attendance since 6.00 a.m., leaving Mr. Irwin, H.M. Inspector of Mines, supervising rescue operations.

At 10.40 a.m. Mr. Cope telephoned the Area General Manager that they could not get to the entrapped men on account of the heat and smoke making the place impassable, and considered that it may be necessary to seal off the area.

At 10.40 a.m., the original Brigade retired, and a second Brigade continued in the work of excavating the floor trench, and attempting to divert cool air into the rise heading by means of brattice sheets, which again proved ineffective.

At 10.50 a.m., the Area General Manager held a conference at which the following were present :-

Messrs W.Wilcox, J.Hebblethwaite, L.Whitfield, T.L.McBride (National Coal Board) Mr.G.Jenkins (H.M.District Inspector of Mines) and Messrs Baddeley and Jones (National Union of Mineworkers).

It was unanimously agreed that everything possible had been done to recover the isolated men, Cooke and Hughes, and that there was nothing left but that the affected area be sealed off.

At 10.55 a.m., the Area General Manager instructed Mr. Cope that all personnel be withdrawn forthwith from that area.

At 11.00 a.m., Mr.Hay, on the instructions of Mr.Cope, despatched a fireman to notify Mr.Irwin and all personnel to come outbye.

At 11.00 a.m., Messrs H.S.Scott, H.M.Divisional Inspector of Mines and W.Brown, H.M.District Inspector of Mines, arrived, and after further discussion it was decided to erect the stoppings thus :-

- (1) The intake stopping to be on the Hesketh main crut just inbye the bottom of the Ten Feet Cross Cut; and
- (2) The return stopping to be in the Old Whitfield return just inbye the top of the Ten Feet Cross Cut.

When the conference had agreed on the sites of the stoppings, the Area General Manager communicated with Mr.E.Cope and asked if he agreed whether or not these were the most efficacious sites for the stoppings. Messrs Cope and Hay agreed.

Mr.Jenkins then communicated with Mr.Irwin, and asked him if he agreed with the decision that everything possible had been done to recover Cooke and Hughes, and that there was nothing left but to seal up the affected area. Mr.Irwin concurred with the decision which was expressed to the conference.

In the meantime and at 10.25 a.m., a Rescue Brigade and Search Party were sent by the Sub-Area Agent via No.4 North Bambury to No.3 North Bambury, which was a separate fresh air circuit, in search of Shearer. It was thought that Shearer may have gone to No.3 Bambury Junction and crossed No.3 Bambury level and may have been alive in fresh air on the inbye side of the back dip on the Bambury level.

When the joint parties arrived at the Bambury back dip crossing at No.3 North Bambury level, they met the dense smoke coming up the Bambury back dip and had not located Shearer. From this point the Rescue Brigade went forward into the dense smoke using a life-line, anchored in the clear atmosphere, to keep them together. The Rescue Brigade failed again to locate Shearer and retired inbye to the fresh air on No.3 Bambury Level.

At 11.45 a.m. Mr.H.J.Crofts, Divisional Production Director, came to the Office and he was informed of the decision which had been made. When the circumstances had been explained to him, he concurred with the decision which the conference had already made.

The conference then agreed that the type of stopping to be used should consist of bags of "sloppy" concrete, and that the stoppings should be raised in webs three feet thick.

The instructions relating to the type and erection of the stoppings were communicated to Messrs Cope and Hay in the pit, and to Messrs Hebblethwaite, Whitfield and Dobson who were on the Surface and about to descend to assist in the supervision of the erection of the stoppings.

The Sub-Area Agent organised the concrete mixing arrangements on the Surface, and the manpower for transport and work at the stoppings.

While the concrete was being mixed and the flow started, some 6,000 bags of stonedust, which were adjacent to the site of the intake stopping, were used to erect the first web of the intake stopping.

Meantime, while concrete was in transit, a Rescue Brigade with their breathing apparatus and Mr.Cope and Mr.Hebblethwaite with the aid of smoke helmets, attempted to examine the proposed site of the return stopping. They reported that the smoke was so dense and the heat intolerable that the site was inaccessible.

When this fact was reported to the Surface, instructions were given to put the intake stopping on as quickly as possible and then all men were to be withdrawn from the mine.

At 1.00 p.m. Messrs G.Jenkins and T.L.McBride (Area Safety & Research Engineer) descended the Hesketh Pit and proceeded inbye to the stoppings and stayed until the intake stopping was completed at 4.30 p.m. and the separation doors in the Ten Feet Cross Cut were opened with a view to balancing the pressure and admitting fresh air in to cool the return.

At 4.45 p.m. Sir Ben Smith, Chairman of the National Coal Board, West Midlands Division, together with Mr.Dando, Deputy Production Director, West Midlands Division and Mr.Orchard, Secretary, West Midlands Division, arrived. The Sub-Area Agent explained the nature of the occurrence, and the steps which had been taken to combat the same.

At this time, 4.45 p.m., Mr.Hay, the Manager, issued a bulletin which described the events up to that time. (See Appendix 1).

All men were out of the mine at 5.05 p.m.

It was then decided to reduce the fan speed to give a reduction in water gauge from 6" to 3".

Instructions were then given that mine air samples should be collected hourly from the fan drift and analysed. (A copy of the analyses is given in Appendix 11).

At 8.40 p.m., the Sub-Area Agent noticed that there was no smoke in the fan drift, but there was a smell of burnt wood.

At 10.00 p.m., the Sub-Area Agent handed the night watch over to Messrs E.Steele (Area Planning Engineer) and H.Ogden (Area Surveyor).

At 3.30 a.m., on the 10th December, 1948, Mr.Steele reported that smoke was emitting from the fan discharge. The smoke had cleared again at 5.00 a.m.

The fan drift watch was maintained until 9.00 a.m. on the 10th December, 1948.

At this time, another conference comprising of Messrs I.W.Cumberbatch, E.Cope, W.Wilcox, J.Hebblethwaite, L.Whitfield, and T.L.McBride of the National Coal Board together with Messrs H.S.Scott, G.Jenkins, W.Brown, C.Dobson and W.G.Irwin of H.M. Inspectorate and Messrs Baddeley and Jones of the National Union of Mineworkers, met to discuss further procedure to make the mine safe.

It was decided that a preliminary examination underground should be made by Rescue Brigades from the Pit Bottom to the stopping, including connections to the return, and to collect an air sample at the proposed site of the return stopping.

The agreed instructions to Rescue Brigades are given in Appendix III., and their telephoned reports back to the Surface in Appendix IV.

From the report received from the Brigade at 1.06 p.m., the conference considered that the physical conditions prevailing at the proposed site of the return stopping were such that the stopping could be built, and at 1.12 p.m. agreement was reached that the work on this stopping should be proceeded with immediately.

Arrangements were made for one Rescue Brigade to be in constant attendance near the site of the stopping and another Brigade to remain in reserve at the Hardmine Junction, some 300 yards farther outbye.

The concrete commenced to arrive at the site at approximately 2.45 p.m., and continued to arrive and be built in position at the rate of 1,000 bags an hour, and manhandled by relays of men, spaced two feet apart, through the Ten Feet Cross Cut.

The greater part of the work on building the stopping was accomplished by workmen without the use of breathing apparatus, but the time came when the convectional current existing in the roadway ceased to function and the air became vitiated with the products of combustion, and the Rescue Brigade was called upon to complete the stopping. The stopping, which was six feet thick, was completed at 6.30 p.m.

The remainder of the concrete still in transit was utilised to re-inforce the main intake stopping, making it a total thickness of fifteen feet. All persons then withdrew from the mine and reached the Surface at 7.30 p.m.

In the interval, Mr.R.Yates, H.M.Deputy Chief Inspector of Mines, had arrived at 3.30 p.m., and the position was explained to him by the Sub-Area Agent, and he agreed with the decision which the conference had made.

At 8.00 p.m., the Sub-Area Agent gave instructions for three Rescue Brigades to be available at 6.00 a.m. on Saturday morning, 11th December, 1948, and that a team of men should be taken to re-inforce the intake stopping a further three feet, making it a total thickness of eighteen feet - twelve feet concrete and six feet dust.

Instructions were also given for a Rescue Brigade to collect samples of return air in the Hesketh back crut, inbye the Bowling Alley return. These were collected at 7.00 a.m., and the results of the analyses of the samples are given in Appendix II.

Further instructions were given for a Search Party consisting of two Overmen and two Firemen from the Institute Pit, together with one Rescue Brigade, to stand by until these samples had been analysed.

A sufficient number of Firemen were to be available to assist in the general inspection of the mine, and the fan was to be speeded up at 6.00 a.m. to restore the normal ventilation.

At 6.00 a.m. on Saturday, 11th December, 1948, the two Rescue Brigades, and a company of men to build stoppings, descended the Hesketh Pit to carry out the first instruction.

At 8.30 a.m. the results of the analyses of the two air samples, collected by the Rescue Brigade at 7.00 a.m., were available (see Appendix 11) and, after perusal, the Sub-Area Agent decided to send the Search Party with a bird and stretcher down the Institute Pit.

This party was given written instructions on how to proceed in search of Shearer (see Appendix V).

The party located Shearer's body on the crossing of No.3 Junction in the Bambury Main Return Dip at 9.35 a.m.

The position where Shearer was found was approximately 100 yards outbye from where he had been working, and was within seven feet of No.3 telephone and only 60 yards from intake air and safety along No.3 North Bambury level.

The Search Party brought Shearer's body to the Surface.

At 10.00 a.m., the thickening of the intake stopping was completed, and instructions were given to the Rescue Brigade to replace the Regulator Doors in the back crut, and to open the Regulator Slide 3". The Cross Cut Doors were to be left off so that ventilation would be continuously circulating through the Ten Feet Cross Cut Doors.

By arrangement with the representatives of the workmen, two pairs of Workmen's Inspectors', together with representatives of the Officials and Management made a general inspection of the whole of the workings of the Hesketh and Institute Pits including the stoppings.

At 12.30 p.m., the examinations were completed, and the examiners unanimously considered that the mine was now safe for the re-admission of workmen. The official reports, on Mines & Quarries Form 75, were posted on the pithead at 1.00 p.m.

During the morning and at 10.45 a.m., Messrs R.Yates, G.Jenkins, S.Hay, J.K.Walker and T.L.McBride descended the mine and made an inspection of the stoppings. They expressed their satisfaction on the effectiveness of the stoppings.

The Manager collected samples of air at the return stopping, the results of which are given in Appendix 11.

At the conclusion of operations, tribute could be paid to the Inspectorate, Officials, Rescue Brigades and Workmen for their technical advice and assistance, and the unstinted loyalty of the men in the execution of their tasks in rendering the mine safe at the earliest possible moment.

13th December, 1948:

APPENDIX ONE :

NATIONAL COAL BOARD
CHATTERLEY-WHITFIELD COAL BOARD UNIT

9th December, 1948.

STATEMENT BY MR. S. HAY, COLLIERY MANAGER, OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
IN WHICH THE UNDERMENTIONED MEN ARE PRESUMED TO HAVE LOST THEIR
LIVES :-

SAMUEL RICHARD HUGHES, 89, Biddulph Road, Chell Green, Stoke-on-Trent. Fireman. Age 36 years.	HARRY COOKE, 48, Stringer Street, Biddulph, Staffs. Collier. Age 32 years.	PERCY SHEARER, Hill Top, Brown Edge, Nr. Leek. Pulley Oiler. Age 61 years.
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The above mentioned, HUGHES and COOKE went to work on the night of December 8th. 1948, in the Hesketh Pit, Whitfield Colliery, in the Old Whitfield Seam. SHEARER went to work on the same night in the Institute Pit.

Mr. S. Hay, Manager, states :

"I was called to the Pit at 2.45 a.m. on December 9th. 1948. After consultation with Mr. W. Wilcox, Sub-Area Agent, I descended the Hesketh Pit and went straight to the Old Whitfield. I found the conveyor gear head in the Old Whitfield Belt Dip was burning and that the roadsides in the Belt Dip were also on fire. On my way inbye I passed the Fireman, W. BROUGH, who was being conveyed outbye on a stretcher suffering from the effects of fumes consequent upon his having made determined attempts to reach HUGHES and COOKE whom he knew were working in a position of danger relative to the fire. Accompanied by Mr. J.K. Walker, the Undermanager, and other Officials and workmen, we attacked the fire with fire extinguishers, stone dust and water.. Our attempts to extinguish the fire were frustrated because the door in the Belt Dip had to be opened frequently thereby admitting fresh air to the fire. Rescue teams had been called out and took part in the attempt to reach the missing men, but it was eventually found impossible due to heat and fumes, to reach these men. At a Conference attended by the Divisional Inspector of Mines, District Inspector of Mines, the Divisional Production Director, the Area General Manager, the Area Safety Engineer, Sub-Area Agents of the North Staffs District and Messrs Baddeley and Jones, of the North Staffs N.U.M., acting on information received from the Area Mining Engineer, the Colliery Manager and Mr. Irwin, Assistant Inspector of Mines, who were underground, at the scene of the fire, it was decided most reluctantly to attempt to seal off the District. The stopping in the Main Intake Airway was built. In the Return Airway, however, where it was intended to build a second stopping, the heat and smoke were so intense that it was impossible for men to work, even when equipped with Rescue Apparatus and smoke helmets. There can be no doubt that the two men HUGHES and COOKE would have been asphyxiated a considerable time before the decision to seal off the District was taken."

APPENDIX TWO:

NATIONAL COAL BOARD
CHATTERLEY-WHITEFIELD COAL BOARD UNIT

HOURLY AIR SAMPLES HESKETH - PLATT PIT FAN DRIFT - DEC. 9th - 13th 1948.

Fan on half speed from 5.30 p.m. Quantity estimated
125,000 C.F.M.

Water gauge varies slightly with variations in steam pressure. Water gauge dropped from 6.2 inches to 3.0 to 3.1 inches.

<u>DATE:</u>	<u>HOUR:</u>	<u>CO₂</u>	<u>CH₄</u>	<u>CO</u>	
9.12.48	5.0 p.m.	.25	.55	.013	
"	6.0 "	.15	.40	.0036	
"	7.0 "	.22	.50	.0030	
"	8.0 "	.12	.54	Nil	
"	8.40 "	No smoke in Fan Drift			but smell of burned wood.
"	9.0 "	.20	.52	.0018	
"	10.0 "	.20	.54	.0022	- Stronger smell reported in Fan Drift.
"	11.0 "	.25	.54	.0022	- Line on W.G. Chart at 11.30 p.m. caused by putting ink on pen.
"	12.0 "	.25	.56	.0028	Definitely smoke in Fan Drift at midnight.
10.12.48	1.0 a.m.	.24	.58	.0028	Seemed less at 1.0 a.m.
"	2.0 "	.21	.59	.0039	
"	3.0 "	.25	.57	.0035	- 3.30 a.m. Evasee emitting smoke.
"	4.0 "	.25	.59	.0028	- Spoke to Mr. Cope 4.0 a.m.
"	5.0 "	.23	.59	.0035	- Fan Evasee clear of smoke
"	6.0 "	.19	.59	.0028	- " " " " "
"	7.0 "	.25	.61	.0028	
"	8.0 "	.19	.59	.0028	- Fan Evasee apparently clear of smoke but strong smell still.
"	8.30 "	.20	.62		- Still clear of smoke
"	9.0 "	.24	.60	.0027	
"	9.30 "	.20	.61	.0022	
"	10.0 "	.24	.60	.0028	
"	11.0 "	.24	.63	.0028	- Fan Drift definitely clear of smoke.
"	12.0 noon	.25	.64	.0028	
"	1.0 p.m.	.25	.65	.0028	
"	2.0 "	.30	.70	.0028	
"	3.0 "	.30	.67	.0026	
"	4.0 "	.30	.69	.0021	
"	5.0 "	.25	.69	.0017	
"	6.0 "	.24	.68	.0017	
"	7.0 "	.23	.61	.0015	- Stopping completed in Return.
"	8.0 "	.22	.61	.0014	
"	9.0 "	.20	.64	.0017	
"	10.0 "	.23	.65	.0015	
"	11.0 "	.27	.61	.0035	
"	12.0 "	.27	.64	.0021	
11.12.48	1.0 a.m.	.25	.66	.0028	- At 12.30 a.m. I thought the smell in the Fan Drift was much stronger than on previous visits during the night - (Sgd)E. Steele.
"	2.0 "	.29	.66	.0025	
"	3.0 "	.27	.65	.0021	
"	4.0 "	.27	.67	.0024	

APPENDIX TWO:

Sheet - 2 -

<u>DATE:</u>	<u>HOUR:</u>	<u>CO₂</u>	<u>CH₄</u>	<u>CO</u>	
11.12.48	5.0 a.m.	.29	.67	.0025	- 5.50 a.m. phoned Mr. Wilcox with figures to 4.0 a.m.
"	6.0 "	.33	.72	.0020	- Fan speeded up at 6.0 a.m.
"	7.0 "	.30	.75	.0017	
"	8.0 "	.30	.70	.0014	
"	9.0 "	.30	.68	.0012	
"	10.0 "	.30	.70	.0014	
"	11.0 "	.30	.72	.0012	
"	12.0 noon	.32	.74	.0014	
12.12.48	9.0 a.m.	.22	.54	.0016	
13.12.48	10.0 "	.20	.50	less than .0005	

UNDERGROUND SAMPLES:

<u>DATE:</u>	<u>HOUR:</u>	<u>CO₂</u>	<u>CH₄</u>	<u>CO</u>	<u>C₂</u>	<u>N₂</u>	
10.12.48	1.06 p.m.	.37	.33	.019	20.00		Proposed site of Return Stopping.
11.12.48	7.00 a.m.	.20	.22	.0028	20.43	79.15	- Back Crut Inbye of Bowling Alley Return.
11.12.48	7.00 a.m.	.32	.59	Nil	19.96	79.13	- Bowling Alley Return 50 yards Inbye from Back Crut.
11.12.48	11.00 a.m.	5.48	13.34	.17	9.41	71.60	- Sample taken at Return Stopping in the area 3 feet from the roof in the presence of Messrs Yates, Jenkins and McBride.
11.12.48	11.00 a.m.	1.30	3.38	.07	17.50	77.82	- Sample taken in the general body at the Return Stopping in the presence of the above named.

APPENDIX THREE

NATIONAL COAL BOARD
CHATTERLEY-WHITEFIELD COAL BOARD UNIT

INSTRUCTIONS FOR RESCUE TEAMS - 10th DECEMBER, 1948.

No. 1 Team:

Proceed to the 1st cross cut beyond the Banbury Junction, pass through the cross cut and examine the Return for heat and smoke, report back to Bank on the Phone at the Cockshead Haulage Engine Room.

No. 2 Team:

Stays at the Pit Bottom and awaits instructions from No. 1 Team Captain who will receive his instructions from the Surface.

No. 1 Team:

On instructions from the Bank proceed to the Hardmine cross cut and examine Return for heat and smoke. Report to Bank as instruction (1) Phone at Hardmine Junction.

No. 2 Team: Stays at the Cockshead Haulage Engine Room and awaits instructions from No. 1 Team Captain who will receive his orders from Surface.

No. 1 Team:

To move up to the Main Haulage, examine stopping and cross cut for heat, and smoke, and take an air sample inbye the cross cut, and report back by Phone to Bank.

APPENDIX FOUR

NATIONAL COAL BOARD
CHATTERLEY-WHITFIELD COAL BOARD UNIT

10th DECEMBER, 1948.

No. 1 Team:

Message at 11.45 a.m. Landed at the Cockshead.
" 11.55 a.m. Team moving in from the Cockshead
to the Banbury.
" 12.20 p.m. Team at Hardmine Junction.
Return at Banbury cross cut. No smoke.
Hygrometer 73° dry 67° wet IN return.
12.30 p.m. Instructions given to go forward to
the stopping, coupled, examine
stopping, Ten Feet cross cut and
return. Take air samples in Return,
and return coupled to the Hardmine
Phone.

No. 2 Team:

12.30 p.m. Move in to the Cockshead uncoupled.
12.44 p.m. No. 2 Team arrived at Cockshead.
1.06 p.m. No change at Stopping. Clear 10
rings from bottom of Dip upwards.
One sample 5 rings up Dip (second
bottle broken).

R. Trigg.

<u>Dry:</u>	<u>wet:</u>	<u>Yards:</u>
77°	70°	10 from cross cut door.
85°	90°	5 Up Dip
100°	100°	10 " "

Smoke moving slowly into ventilation.
First 10 yards up Dip smoke is moving
outbye 1 foot from the roof.

1.12 p.m. Agreed to put stopping on Return side.

Finish.

1.45 p.m. Teams reached Bank.

APPENDIX FIVE.

NATIONAL COAL BOARD
CHATTERLEY-WHITEFIELD COAL BOARD UNIT

INSTRUCTION TO SEARCH PARTY:

11th DECEMBER, 1948.

A. HOLDCROFT	}	<u>INSTITUTE PIT</u>
D. STUBBS		
P. JONES		
J. FOY		

To descend Institute Pit and travel the Bambury Crut and Bambury Dip to No. 4 in search of P. SHEARER. To look roundabouts at Nos. 2, 3 and 4.

To report by Phone at :

- (1) Top of Bambury Dip
- (2) No. 3
- (3) No. 4

Take stretcher and bird.